Re: [tor-relays] Dear OBFS4 bridge operators, please enable timing and packet-size obfuscations to help clients facing timing analysis attacks.

[pasture_clubbed242--- via tor-relays <tor-relays@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Out of curiosity, can any other options be passed with ServerTransportOptions besides iat-mode?


I could only find this article saying there is a 'cert=' option, which initially appear useful for Tor.

https://hamy.io/post/000d/how-to-hide-obfuscate-any-traffic-using-obfs4/

Thank you
On Monday, September 23rd, 2024 at 6:15 AM, George Hartley via tor-relays - tor-relays at lists.torproject.org <tor-relays@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> Hello Tor community,
> 
> this e-mail applies to you if you are running an obfs4 (now known under the name lyrebird) bridge or want to do so in the future.
> 
> Some recent posts on this list has shown that traffic timing analysis can be used to locate a users or onion services guard nodes or bridges. This is not really something new.
> 
> For bridge users, there is a way to try to protect themselves against this, but your bridge configuration must support it.
> 
> By enabling iat-mode on your obfs4 /lyrebird bridge, then maybe DPI (Deep Packet Inspection) hardware can sometimes be defeated either entirely, or at least the process of tracking users can be slowed down.
> 
> OBFS4/Lyrebird support two times of traffic obfuscation:
> 
> > ServerTransportOptions obfs4 iat-mode=1
> 
> 
> This will make your bridge send MTU sized packets, in order to make
> true packet size analysis harder.
> 
> There is also what the author of obfs4/Lyrebird called "paranoid mode":
> 
> > ServerTransportOptions obfs4 iat-mode=2
> 
> For each write, a variable length packet will be sent, which will result
> in both making true packet size and round trip time analysis harder.
> 
> If your bridge is distributed by BridgeDB, the next time someone receives
> a batch of bridges with your bridge in it, the bridge-line will have the iat-mode variable set to the one
> you set on your bridge server.
> 
> Your bridge will still work even if you enable these defenses and a user chooses
> to set iat-mode to 0 in his bridge line.
> 
> There is a small performance penalty for both mode 1 and 2, but nothing very severe.
> 
> I believe this, along with Vanguards, and so on, is needed to keep users and services somewhat secure.
> 
> Let me know what you think.
> 
> -   George
>     
> 
> 

_______________________________________________
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays