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Re: [tor-relays] Dear OBFS4 bridge operators, please enable timing and packet-size obfuscations to help clients facing timing analysis attacks.



pasture_clubbed242--- via tor-relays wrote:

> I could only find this article saying there is a 'cert=' option, which
> initially appear useful for Tor.

Cert is default in obfs4 bridelines, you can create yours with:

~# cat /var/lib/tor-instances/01/fingerprint
nikname fingerprint
~# cat /var/lib/tor-instances/01/pt_state/obfs4_bridgeline.txt
# obfs4 torrc client bridge line
#
# This file is an automatically generated bridge line based on
# the current obfs4proxy configuration.  EDITING IT WILL HAVE
# NO EFFECT.
#
# Before distributing this Bridge, edit the placeholder fields
# to contain the actual values:
#  <IP ADDRESS>  - The public IP address of your obfs4 bridge.
#  <PORT>        - The TCP/IP port of your obfs4 bridge.
#  <FINGERPRINT> - The bridge's fingerprint.

Bridge obfs4 <IP ADDRESS>:<PORT> <FINGERPRINT> cert=glib+gliberish+gliberish iat-mode=0

-- 
╰_╯ Ciao Marco!

Debian GNU/Linux

It's free software and it gives you freedom!

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