Re: [tor-talk] de-anonymization by correlating circuit changes

[Curious Kid <letsshareinformation@xxxxxxxxx>]

> From: "bemoo129@xxxxxxxxxxxx" <bemoo129@xxxxxxxxxxxx>

> Sent: Tuesday, August 23, 2011 1:20 AM
> Subject: Re: [tor-talk] de-anonymization by correlating circuit changes
> 
>T hanks Curious Kid, I meant exactly what you wrote.
> 
> Are zou sure, TOR avoids circuits in which exit and entrz are in 
> the same countrz? It happened not often, but im sure, I have got 
> circuits with all relazs in the same country. I remember e.g. three 
> netherland relays in one circuit, or three german...

I just looked into it, and I was wrong. Tor prevents circuits with the entry and exit both being from the same /16 subnet. That's the first half of the IP address. It doesn't stop them from being in the same country by default. See https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3678 for recent discussion on this topic.

Also, it's not just about which nodes you select. There can be all sorts of intermediate hops between Tor nodes, and the destination and the user could already be under surveillance. Paul Syverson (the inventor of onion routing) went over a few of those situations in his response to your question.

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