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Interception of tor exit traffic.
Sorry about offending you personally BUT ALL of those 6 "lightweight"
legal texts point out the fact that not ONLY do TOR operators in the US
have a RIGHT to monitor the misuse of their facilities and that such
monitoring can be freely turned over to USG, state or law enforcement.
Add into the effect of stored communications exempted by Jackson and
later Councilman , on technical interception, hooking the tor output
buffers or simply using BPF/PCAP providers on the same node as the tor
software which read out of memory locations not intercept communication
in transit and presto you have a quite legally monitored network it
would seem. That IS of interest to US based tor operators and as the
user of tor has NO contract explicit or implicit with either the
middleman or the exit nodes there ARE no legal remedies to this sort of
interception at present.
As Chris in his official guise of Technical Manager of EFF has chosen
answer the initial posting with rudeness and insults
and did NOT directly address the issue the postings have all pointed to
and instead gave the usual IANAL.
I elected to post very brief lightweight extracts of the pertinent
Title 18 code to the list, as well as the case in which 4th amendment
protections against electronic communications intercept were vanished
with the decision of the court in Councilman. As it stands now this is
US law. As I and many others run tor nodes from our place of business
this branch of law is critical to our operation of same tor nodes lest
we get hauled off to jail for a remote tor user fetching say child porn
through an exit node in the US.
and when its a choice between myself and some NAMBLA member abusing
little boys via tor you can bet how fast ALL of the legally gathered
logs from my SHADOW IDS I or any other operator has will wind up in the
hands of law enforcement voluntarily when the prosecutor comes
knocking, same for kidnapping,murder,rape or other threats against
anothers person transmitted via tor/webmail /tor/imap tor/pop3 etc.
TOR and ECPA ARE NOT a SHIELD for criminal acts...
again sorry to anyone offended BUT I am looking for an official
response from EFF attorneys not Chris Palmers IANAL.
As all statutes involving this and case law up to and exceeding
Councilman would seem to support my position that
Monitoring TOR exit traffic to enable the continued availability of
that service in the face of these threats would seem on the face of it
to be legal(GET a Lawyers advice as I did).
Laws for the individual states may differ from ECPA however, again see a
no for US Tor operators this is NOT spam it is legal survival
as this is OR-talk not OR-dev this forum is an entirely appropriate
place for this discussion.
a tor operator
ps Now I will shut up having said my piece and wait for others opinions
on the Subject at hand
that of monitoring of tor exit traffic.
Ben Wilhelm wrote:
Dude. Stop spamming the mailing list. I'm perfectly fine with reading
seven emails on this subject, but seven emails consisting entirely of
dense legal text and brief corrections, sent by a single person, all
of which could have been trivially compiled into a *single* email, is
just plain annoying.
(If someone wants to smack me down and say "no, this is perfectly fine
for this list", go for it, but I know I'd be annoyed if this was on a
mailing list I admined ;) )