Sorry, but I am too slow to follow this discussion. alexyz, are you trying to keep the adversary from maintaining a list of all servers? It seems obvious to me that in order to achieve that, *any* anonymous party must not be capable of maintaining such a list. But that renders at least some servers entirely useless, doesn't it? In other words, the goal of the adversary here is the same as that of a legitimate user, only the resources of the legitimate user are far more precious. matthias On Mon, Apr 18, 2005 at 12:35:38AM -0700, Chris Palmer wrote: > To: or-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxx > From: Chris Palmer <chris@xxxxxxx> > Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2005 00:35:38 -0700 > Subject: Re: Publishing node IPs > > alexyz@xxxxxxxxxx writes: > > > I understand the need to keep a list in a central server for initial > > connections. But why make this list public by publishing the IPs in a > > webpage? > > Tor uses (a subset of) HTTP for transport when grabbing the directory. > If it used some other protocol, the directory would still have to be > public. > > > Isn't it ambiguous that an anonymous network is identifying itself? By > > making the node IPs public, there is an implicit message saying "hey > > everyone afraid of me, here is how to block me". > > Being anonymous and hiding the fact that you are being anonymous are two > different problems, two different threats. For Tor to solve both would > be great. The developers have wisely decided to tackle only one very > hard problem at a time. :) > > Let us know if you have any ideas about how to solve the latter problem. > > > -- > http://www.eff.org/about/staff/#chris_palmer > -- Institute of Information Systems, Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin web: http://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/~fis/ e-mail: fis@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx tel: +49 30 2093-5734 fax: +49 30 2093-5741 office: Spandauer Straße 1, R.324, 10178 Berlin, Germany
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