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Re: BOGUS AUTHORITY ALERT: interesting cached-status/1A0999C05AE2B9A3CF474077F06060E91B3A847 file

     On Mon, 31 Mar 2008 22:20:53 -0400 Roger Dingledine <arma@xxxxxxx> wrote:
>On Mon, Mar 31, 2008 at 07:56:29PM -0500, Scott Bennett wrote:
>>      It has now been several hours since I posted a message about an impostor
>> authority.  Having received no response thus far from the list, I am reposting
>> the message below with a stronger Subject: line.
>Calm down. Your Tor client doesn't care if other people claim to be
>authorities. The authorities that you trust are hard-coded in config.c,
>or they're in your torrc if you specify new DirServer lines (which
>you shouldn't).

     Okay.  I understood previously that the hard-coded ones would be expected,
but not that they would also be the only ones accepted.
>Your directory mirror will collect other v2 directory networkstatus
>documents just in case other clients trust them as authorities and want
>a copy. (For example, if we added a new authority to the list, but you
>hadn't upgraded yet, it would be handy for your cache to cache the new
>stuff too.)

     OTOH, it also means that my server will happily spread misinformation to
all servers requesting the status documents, and those adequately gullible will
accept the bad information, unless I have a way to prevent my server from doing
>>  I'd also like to make the
>> additional comment that I would very much like to see a torrc line available,
>> similar to ExcludeNodes, that would allow individual tor operators to ignore
>> specific directory servers when those operators decide there is a problem with
>> those servers.  For example, "ExcludeAuthorities" would refuse to accept status
>> or consensus documents from the listed servers.  "ExcludeDirectoryNodes" would
>> refuse to contact the DirPort of each listed server.
>Your client or cache probably got the bogus v2 networkstatus by going
>to one of the caches and asking for "all" v2 networkstatuses. The bogus
>ones will expire after a while.
     But is there currently a way that I can, w.r.t. my torrc, "learn" from
the experience?  I.e., is there a way I can tell it to *reject* any such bogus
networkstatus documents regarding that "authority" in the future?

                                  Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG
* Internet:       bennett at cs.niu.edu                              *
* "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good  *
* objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments *
* -- a standing army."                                               *
*    -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790         *