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TOR+UN / Dept State / etc
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- Subject: TOR+UN / Dept State / etc
- From: "Wilfred L. Guerin" <wilfredguerin@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 29 Apr 2008 18:15:24 +0700
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What ever happened to the multitude of UN/country authorities who
suggested using TOR as a mixer to prevent local origin tracing?
I know the US foreign entity tap on the athority server neutralizes
blind nodes (as designed) and that many intl boundary and pering
facilities full proxy entity traffic like prq* and the crypto
authority servers for logging or interjection (amongst more obvious
public services.goo and wire providers) so its assumed any composite
entity would be in the automatic hijack system by now, but what of
policy support for practical uses?
DHS and ETED have demonstrated in route and endpoint trapping (slaves
to the master auth = same entity on paper) and the obvious fake exit
traps, but apparently noone has done a current analysis for practical
implementations like small physical facility proxy through vpn (to
institution uplink) (which us dept state was supposed to be doing
anyways) and high visibility target origin mixing (like UN used to
diversify perceived location of staff but was intrinsicly defeated by
mim and sniffing of traffic to their auth servers...)
What is the current political status and perception?
Or do I have to announce the malevolent design of TOR much the same as
hushmail or FCC Part 15 Rules?
I'm not exactly liking the bullship comingout of EFF lately, their
fraud and criminal intent must always be eradicated, but there is no
reason for you not to tell of intrinsic designed exploits in TOR
unless you are knowingly protecting criminal intent.
-Wilfred L. Guerin