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Re: [tor-talk] about tor entry node

On Fri, 07 Dec 2012 23:23:17 +0100
"Sebastian G. <bastik.tor>" <bastik.tor@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> Low latency networks such as Tor suffer from traffic correlation,
> which has not been defeated yet. As far as I know this would be very
> hard to accomplish, if at all.. (I'm not experienced enough with this
> topic.)

There is a relatively simple strategy for mitigating correlation
attacks: decoy traffic. The problem is, the lower the latency, the more
decoy traffic you need to effectively cover the trail. And to avoid the
decoys being readily identified, a proportion of them must propagate
through the network by at least two hops. This is plausible for high
latency networks such as remailers but completely impractical for Tor,
unless available bandwidth ever significantly exceeds demand.


3072D/F3A66B3A Julian Yon (2012 General Use) <pgp.2012@xxxxxx>

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