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Re: [tor-talk] Massive Bandwidth Onion Services
AFAIK, HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints >= 3 is also for the benefit
of the client, so if intro point #1 doesn't work for the client, it
can try to connect at intro point #2, and then finally at intro point
#3 before giving up. So let's say my Tor client looks up your Tor
hidden service descriptor and attempts to connect at intro point #1
and that fails. What would/should it do at that point? Give up?
On Mon, Dec 19, 2016 at 5:47 AM, Alec Muffett <alec.muffett@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> As an aside, this is what I am currently using as a daemon config.
> Comments welcome.
> I'm trying not to use Guards because again it would be rude to hammer them
> with vast data flows when instead the pain can be spread around a bit more;
> given that my target deployments are unlikely to be truly anonymous (eg:
> Facebook) this isn't much of an anonymity issue.
> $ more /home/alecm/master/halfagig/hs6.d/config
> DataDirectory /home/alecm/master/halfagig/hs6.d
> HiddenServiceDir /home/alecm/master/halfagig/hs6.d/
> # HiddenServicePort 19 localhost:8506 # chargen, eventually
> HiddenServicePort 80 localhost:10506
> HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints 3 # <--- maybe 2 or 1 here?
> LongLivedPorts 19,80
> CircuitBuildTimeout 60
> LearnCircuitBuildTimeout 0
> PredictedPortsRelevanceTime 0
> RendPostPeriod 37 minutes
> SocksPort 0
> UseEntryGuards 0
> UseEntryGuardsAsDirGuards 0
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