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Re: [tor-talk] You Can Now Watch YouTube Videos with Onion Hidden Services

Im not the operator of the service but here are the advantages:

- Youtube is made by a dick company to humanity called Google, which is
funding their services by stealing/collecting users data. So the JS
which is closed source in case of YB prevent you from watching the
videos unless you allow the JS. in case of invidous the JS used already
licensed and the source code you can find it here:


Plus you can watch the videos without the need to allow any JS.

- Connecting to Youtube directly , then you are putting your security on
the SSL/TLS encryption. Whereas using in invidous hidden services your
security is through the Onion hidden services design more you can watch
Roger Dingledine speech at defcon:


or just normal youtube link if you like


- Its free software and the code is available for install/checkup. You
are referring to FB which is completely the opposite of anything
mentioned here.

Hope that clarify the differences.

Seth David Schoen:
> bo0od writes:
>> This is another front end to YouTube:
> Hi bo0od,
> Thanks for the links.
> This seems to be in a category of "third-party onion proxy for clearnet
> service" which is distinct from the situation where a site operator
> provides its own official onion service (like Facebook's facebookcorewwwi,
> which the company has repeatedly noted it runs itself on its own
> infrastructure).
> Could you explain how this kind of design improves users' privacy or
> security compared to using a Tor exit node to access the public version
> of YouTube?  In this case the proxy will need to act as one side of
> users' TLS sessions with YouTube, so it's in a position to directly
> record what (anonymous) people are watching, uploading, or writing --
> unlike an ordinary exit node which can at most try to infer these
> things from traffic analysis.  Meanwhile, it doesn't prevent YouTube
> from gathering that same information about the anonymous users, meaning
> that this information about users' activity on YouTube can potentially
> tbe gathered by wo entities rather than just one.
> The proxy could also block or falsely claim the nonexistence of selected
> videos, which a regular exit node couldn't do, and if its operator knew
> a vulnerability in some clients' video codecs, it could also serve a
> maliciously modified video to attack them -- which YouTube could do, but
> a regular exit node couldn't.
> Are there tradeoffs that make these risks worth it for some set of
> users?  Maybe teaching people more about how onion services work, or
> showing YouTube that there's a significant level of demand for an
> official onion service?
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