Re: [tor-talk] comparison of Tor and Kovri in regards to deanonymization attacks

[grarpamp <grarpamp@xxxxxxxxx>]

>> I was curious for Monero dev's rationale to pick I2P over Tor
>> Whatever I've seen online doesn't strike me as particularly convincing.

Same could be asked of Zcash strong cryptographic ZKP style
currencies users often using Tor. As well as a handful of other
cryptocurrencies explicitly advertised and designed to use
with Tor.

>> Whatever I've seen online doesn't strike me as particularly convincing.

>> Is there published research in regards to deanonymization attacks against
>> both Tor and I2P

Some are here, some are in sites of other messaging systems...
https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib


All overlay networks currently in production are
massively vulnerable to at least two classes of attack
by sufficiently interested and capable adversaries...


1) Sybil
a) This requires people to actually use PKI to make and use
assertions and identities and to punt the results they get from
their deep social anal probing of each other in real life as
operator peers worldwide... into the consensus, DHT, or whatever
mechanism each network uses for node approval and selection.
b) Also requires complete ongoing analysis of all known physical
and logical metadata and behaviour of the nodes themselves.


2) Global Passive Monitoring
The US NSA, Global and Regional Telecom Corporations,
and other Entities Worldwide, acting both separately and
together, have a complete passive and active view of the
internet from at minimum the Global Tier-1 ISP Level,
including significant analysis and recording capabilities
therein.

Yet everyone still stupidly fails to execute at least a few of
the seemingly available and reasonable countermeasures...

a) Encrypt Everything.
Automatic, on by default, strong crypto suites, forward
secrecy, tofu, psk, rekeying, whatever works best, etc... both...
1) By and between end to end users, same for server to server...
2) On all physical network links worldwide, every port
automagic and independant... fiber, copper, radio, etc...
embedded in the network hardware itself via RFC, IEEE, etc

b) Deploy fulltime network fill traffic aka chaff, to fill the committed
capacity that each node provisioned itself into the [overlay]
network with, dynamically yielding room for and upon native traffic.
This applies both to, logical nets 2a1, and physical nets 2a2, above.

c) Politics, Anarchism, Cryptocurrency Crowdfunding, and
whatever else works to uproot and route around persistant
known bad actors.


3) Etc


Nobody seems to want to do much on the above, to actually
shape those into effective global project efforts, to deploy any
sufficient mitigation finally therein, therefore the vulnerabilities
shall remain.

#OpenFabs , #OpenHW , #OpenSW , #OpenDev , #OpenBiz , #CryptoCurrency
, #Anarchism , #SybilBusters , #EncryptEverything , #FillEverything
... the list gets longer.


Anyone can launch rockets these days.
So there is no reason any of the above and more can't be done.
Go build and launch some rockets.
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