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Re: [tor-talk] Danish data retention on steroids
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On 30/01/2016 04:36, Niels Elgaard Larsen wrote:
> True, but making it official also makes it easier to enforce and to
> make every service provider cooperate.
> For Tor competent and systematically logging might worse that
> draconian measures by dictatorships.
To an extent - dictatorships can also competently and systematically log
The UK is in a very similar policy position, assuming the proposed
bill for investigatory powers goes forward (which it almost certainly
will); anyone who is an ISP can be compelled to do practically
anything. This includes tampering, interference, etc, with data or
equipment, owned by the ISP or not. Tor relay operators in the UK
could be legally compelled to provide access to government and gagged
from discussing it, for one worst-case scenario. This is much worse
than the Danish model, as far as I know.
The interesting questions, at least to me, are around how this changes
the threat model, and how capable Tor is at dealing with attacks that
take advantage of a well-equipped, legally mandated adversary
attempting to deanonymize users. While this isn't the stated goal of
such legislation, it could certainly be used in this manner.
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