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Re: Exit node connection statistics

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On Jul 18, 2008, at 7:39 PM, mplsfox02@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
Of course you can. And if you are able to bring yourself under the top 100 of 500 exit nodes in one day, you can solve it even in two days. Just use a different destination IP for each exit node, then you don't need the bisection method. ;-)

But you are right. Maybe top 100 is too much and I should switch to a top 20 or so?

No, you should turn it off. Having those statistics doesn't add any value to the Tor network, you cannot even make broad statements like "30% of all traffic in Tor goes to xy.com", because you see only a tiny fraction and the real usage is likely to be entirely different - think about how different exit policies etc come into play. Generally, it's always recommended to not log unless you have a reason (for example a bug you're trying to find).

The less verbose your logs are, the less likely it is someone will find them interesting and makes you give them out. This applies to the whole community of relay operators - if it is a well-known fact that most of them log, adversaries might become more persuasive when they ask for logs.

Generally, Tor exit nodes must always be assumed to be malicious, but this of course doesn't mean that once it's a proven fact that an exit is malicious, it will be excluded.

So, a personal question: What is your motive? Do you feel you have a right to know what people are doing? Because this is where the ice gets really thin...