On Thu, Jul 04, 2013 at 09:01:27PM +0000, adrelanos wrote: > China doesn't succeed to 100%, but that's not much of a win. Look how > many users used the Tor network before any Tor-network censorships and > how many people figure out using bridges. The goal of preventing many > people from gaining that information and slowing down the flow of > information works very well for them. > > Don't forget the assumption behind Tor: there are enough free > countries, which tolerate volunteers hosting Tor servers. If that > assumption breaks down, Onion Routing doesn't work. > > Also keep in mind, that there are no Tor servers in China. When the US > starts banning Tor, it will be almost the end of the Tor network. The > core developers live in the US, when they get told, to take another > job, it will be difficult to find new developers. Without Tor servers > in the US and a few other countries with a noticeable amount of Tor > servers, there is usable Tor network anymore. I would move out of the US rather than submit to such an order; I don't think I'm the only one of us who would. That said, the Tor network *is* vulnerable to attempts to suppress the relay operators and directory authorities, which are more dangerous than attacks on the developers - one can release software pseudonymously easily enough. The directory authority attack vector could be weakened by adding support for DAs as hidden services and moving a voting plurality of them to HSes. Recently, Jake and I talked about some ideas for a more radical change, eliminating the DAs *as servers* and just having them intermittently poll directory mirrors to learn descriptors for new routers and upload their votes. I think there will be effective defense strategies for the DAs if it should become necessary. The hardest problem, I think, is defending against attempts to suppress relays by legal force; the current model of total connectivity means it's trivial to enumerate the IPs of all relays. -- Andrea Shepard <andrea@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> PGP fingerprint (ECC): BDF5 F867 8A52 4E4A BECF DE79 A4FF BC34 F01D D536 PGP fingerprint (RSA): 3611 95A4 0740 ED1B 7EA5 DF7E 4191 13D9 D0CF BDA5
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