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Re: [tor-talk] ISP surveillance through Tor?
Andreas Krey writes:
> On Thu, 11 Jul 2013 14:26:43 +0000, Marcos Eugenio Kehl wrote:
> > Hello friends.
> > 1. How could my exit Tor node be in Kabul or Kandahar? As "ipcatcher.net" showed many times. How it is possible a Tor ISP or relay in Afeganistan?
> Some of the geolocation services have the strange habit to place
> addresses they know to be proxies (as tor is) on random places
> instead of either saying the true location or "won't tell".
There are a few codes that geolocation providers use for "anonymous
proxy" (sometimes "A1"). One possibility is that translating this
into "Afghanistan" is a result of some kind of coding bug. It
happens that the code "A1" is the alphabetically first geolocation
country code, while the name "Afghanistan" is the alphabetically
first country name in most lists of countries. Maybe somehow a
code like A1 gets mapped onto "Afghanistan" even though it wasn't
meant to be.
Seth Schoen <schoen@xxxxxxx>
Senior Staff Technologist https://www.eff.org/
Electronic Frontier Foundation https://www.eff.org/join
815 Eddy Street, San Francisco, CA 94109 +1 415 436 9333 x107
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