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[tor-talk] Using the middle relay to guard against correlation attacks.

First off I'm not a computer scientist. Nor am I a Tor expert.

I'm wondering if it is possible to use the middle relay as a buffer to protect against possible correlation attacks.

From my understanding, if the attacker controls the first relay, and the last relay, she can transmit packets at a certain burst rate, and size to generate a visible pattern that can be detected at the other end.

Unless the middle relay interferes in reshaping that pattern.

So what if in creating the circuit, the client would ask the middle relay to buffer the traffic at a certain buffer size and at a certain timer variable? The timer variable is used in the case the buffer does not fill up.

So when the middle relay receives incoming or outgoing traffic for that circuit, it would buffer the data until the buffer is full, then transmit, or until the timeout of the timer has elapsed since first bits of data started to buffer then transmit.

We make the client request from the middle relay to allocate the buffer size and timer in milliseconds, and if they are both 0, then the relay behaves as normal as it is currently.

We also can make the relay set it's own parameters on what the max buffer size should be and max timer variable allowed. If the client circuit creator is asking for too much, or inconsistent values, either give the defined relay max, or ignore, or send back an error to the client.

Is something like that possible to implement in Tor? Does TCP allow it? How well will it scale?


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