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Re: [tor-talk] Illegal Activity As A Metric of Tor Security and Anonymity

On 06/28/2014 01:31 AM, grarpamp wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 27, 2014 at 5:32 PM, coderman <coderman@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> On Fri, Jun 27, 2014 at 11:38 AM, Juan <juan.g71@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> traffic correlation is trivial if you can watch traffic in and
>>       out of the network.
>>> ... Tor, by design, is useless against
>>>         governments that can do traffic analysis. For instance, the US
>>>         government.
>> last but not least, passive confirmation attacks are passe; the best
>> attacks active.
>> "From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types"
>> http://freehaven.net/doc/batching-taxonomy/taxonomy.pdf
> Pending a second read of such papers... I still think a network
> that uses fixed external packet sizes and fills internode links
> with chaff versions of same to meet some fixed clock rate...
> would be more resistant to this. Afaik no network has tried
> this yet.

What do you think of the anonymity network (Dissent) described in this
working draft from Joan Feigenbaum and Bryan Ford?[1]

[1] http://arxiv.org/abs/1312.5307

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