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Re: [tor-talk] Illegal Activity As A Metric of Tor Security and Anonymity

On 6/28/14, Mirimir <mirimir@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 06/28/2014 01:31 AM, grarpamp wrote:
>> On Fri, Jun 27, 2014 at 5:32 PM, coderman <coderman@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> On Fri, Jun 27, 2014 at 11:38 AM, Juan <juan.g71@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> traffic correlation is trivial if you can watch traffic in and
>>>       out of the network.
>>>> ... Tor, by design, is useless against
>>>>         governments that can do traffic analysis. For instance, the US
>>>>         government.
>>> last but not least, passive confirmation attacks are passe; the best
>>> attacks active.
>>> "From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types"
>>> http://freehaven.net/doc/batching-taxonomy/taxonomy.pdf
>> Pending a second read of such papers... I still think a network
>> that uses fixed external packet sizes and fills internode links
>> with chaff versions of same to meet some fixed clock rate...
>> would be more resistant to this. Afaik no network has tried
>> this yet.
> What do you think of the anonymity network (Dissent) described in this
> working draft from Joan Feigenbaum and Bryan Ford?[1]
> [1] http://arxiv.org/abs/1312.5307

"Looks" awesome! Just finished reading it. I am not a cryptographer.
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