I just complained to a company that I got a 403 from using TBB when I went to their website, and they said they had no control, their webhost was doing it, but passed the information on to them, and this is the response from the webhost:
I checked with the team and our system doesn't specifically block Tor but we do have security provisions in place to detect malicious attacks against the system (such as potential DoS attacks). Given the nature of Tor, it could be that these users are being picked up by the system.
Are they seeing specific errors (like a 50x error)? We may be able to get a ticket going so that the team can dig in a bit further. Also, if they provide their originating IP address, we can check our logs for more details.
This is the site I was trying to reach. http://cleantechnica.com/2013/10/23/tesla-model-s-optimized-for-autobahn-video/
--
Christopher Booth
________________________________
From: Martin Kepplinger <martink@xxxxxxxxx>
To: tor-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Tuesday, March 11, 2014 9:45 AM
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Blacklists
Use services that don't block Tor. Tell the other operator why you are
leaving. Ask admins or poke any adress you find from a website that is
important to you, that blocks us, why they are doing so. Tell your
friends to use TBB, it's awesome how useable is it nowadays. They should
just "click to play" flashplayer and just about anyone can use it. It's
the best browser there is. Tor Browsers have to become visible to
(still?) friendly website operators.
It's annoying sometimes but overall I know why I'm doing it and I keep
doing it. It's tiny steps but the only steps to a situation (maybe)
where every private home connection can be an Exit and the Internet
doesn't react in any way to it. I'm glad the torproject offers to
"discriminate" Tor users, it can be done anyways. I just hope it becomes
less and less affordable.
Am 11.03.2014 14:06 schrieb Praedor Tempus:
I think the thinking needs re-thinking. Tor becomes less and less
useful, and less and less attractive to users as more and more sites
block tor. The diminishing returns feeds itself. More people quit
using tor because many or most of the sites they are interested in
prevent them from viewing them, fewer and fewer relays are provided as
people quit tor, tor becomes weaker and weaker. Rinse, repeat.
I do not think sites should be able to simply block classes of
traffic just because they want to. Blocking a spammer is one thing,
it is a response to a single demonstrable negative action but blocking
an entire class is what anti-discrimination laws in the real world are
used to stop. Because it is unjust and simply bad. Why should it be
different on the internet? Carve out the internet from basic societal
rules/laws so discrimination by class is perfectly OK?
I'm merely stating that the simple ability to make a quick and easy
setting change in the exit is all that is needed, not an automatic and
broad default change to tor exit behaviors.
Responding to growing blacklists by shrugging one's shoulders and
saying, "Oh well, you're wrong to do so but...oh well" is not a
functional response. It is a promise of less and less usefulness of
tor...unless the ultimate goal is to provide, in the end, just an
anonymous chat infrastructure since that seems to be the ultimate end
point as sites block tor in greater numbers.
________________________________
From: krishna e bera <keb@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
To: tor-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Monday, March 10, 2014 10:10 PM
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Blacklists
On 14-03-10 06:37 PM, Praedor Tempus wrote:
I was wondering...would a change to tor exits so they direct through
public proxies/anonymizers get around black lists? The tor user would
still be anonymized but the ultimate source address seen by
blacklisting websites would NOT be a tor exit so blocking tor exits
would fail...
Is this too simple? Perhaps add a setting that those who run exits
could configure so their exit routes to a proxy?
praedor
The FAQ gives 3 reasons why Torproject doesnt encourage that
particular
solution to blocking of Tor:
https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#HideExits
To quote therefrom:
a. We can't help but make the information available, since Tor
clients need to use it to pick their paths. So if the "blockers" want
it, they can get it anyway. Further, even if we didn't tell clients
about the list of relays directly, somebody could still make a lot of
connections through Tor to a test site and build a list of the
addresses
they see.
b. If people want to block us, we believe that they should be
allowed
to do so. Obviously, we would prefer for everybody to allow Tor users
to
connect to them, but people have the right to decide who their
services
should allow connections from, and if they want to block anonymous
users, they can.
c. Being blockable also has tactical advantages: it may be a
persuasive response to website maintainers who feel threatened by Tor.
Giving them the option may inspire them to stop and think about
whether
they really want to eliminate private access to their system, and if
not, what other options they might have. The time they might otherwise
have spent blocking Tor, they may instead spend rethinking their
overall
approach to privacy and anonymity.
--
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