I am re-sending this to the mailing list as it apears that the original mailing did not make it, -Manuel ---------------------------------------------------------- Why respect, Why do exit nodes have to be published? Why does the address of *any* node have to be published. Is this an inherent property of the design, or just an implementation shortcoming? Why can not the node resolution be done dynamically as one joins the net. I can easily the possibility of starting a connection, having the local tor consult a central server (call a root node, just as DNS) and then go from there. I get the impression of this being a 'political' decision to avoid being accused of aiding or abetting abusive behavior. If I am wrong then I would love to be corrected, but if it is so then I think the designers should get over it. The current implementation is too easy to censor. What is the use of an anonymity enabling service if it gets blocked? Either you believe in anonimity and free speech with _all_ it's consecuences or you do not. If you do not, then fine; a lot of good people feel the same way and think there are "limits". I, personally, do not and would encourage the tor developers and the EFF to take this view or at least be neutral and let each node decide. At least leave it up to the local node. Make an unpublished / unlisted option just as in pots, and not for testing purposes. What am I missing? Regards, - Manuel
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