Paul, Thanks for the quick comments. On the second point: yes, they are different things but related to the point of one being a necessary condition for the other. No communication (censorship) obviates the possibility of anonymity. I am sure you obviously agree and that your comment is directed towards what should (or, in fact, is) the scope of the project. I understand that all problems can not be solved at once or with one solution. I just feel that more effort should be done not to enable the easy possibility (as blach hole lists) to disable the project. As far as the first point: I assumed that we were all running on the same Matrix, I am just looking for the red pill. Cheers, -Manuel > -----Original Message----- > From: owner-or-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxx > [mailto:owner-or-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Paul Syverson > Sent: Wednesday, May 25, 2005 15:03 > To: or-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxx > Subject: Re: FW: I still do not understand... > > > Hi Manuel, > > Two points. First, if nothing about the nodes is published or > otherwise known to you the Tor client, there is no basis to think that > the network (or the part presented to you) consists of anything but a > hundred nodes run on a few highspeed machines by a single > individual. Actually there is not even the need to setup a hundred > distinct nodes. Basically there is no anonymity protection at all. > > Second, anonymity and censorship resistance are related but not the > same. One could want to provide an anonymous communication network > without a concomitant desire to provide censorship resistance. Also, > censorship resistance is hard, and anonymity is just one of the > building blocks for it. So, if you do want to build censorship > resistance, you need to build good anonymity. And, you need to have > researched, tested, and understood the anonymity provided to know > to use it in the censorship resistance context. > > aloha, > Paul > > > On Wed, May 25, 2005 at 02:44:46PM -0700, admin wrote: > > I am re-sending this to the mailing list as it apears that the > > original mailing did not make it, -Manuel > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------- > > > > Why respect, > > > > Why do exit nodes have to be published? Why does the > address of *any* > > node have to be published. Is this an inherent property of > the design, > > or just an implementation shortcoming? Why can not the node > resolution > > be done dynamically as one joins the net. I can easily the > possibility > > of starting a connection, having the local tor consult a > central server > > (call a root node, just as DNS) and then go from there. > > > > I get the impression of this being a 'political' decision > to avoid being > > accused of aiding or abetting abusive behavior. If I am wrong then I > > would love to be corrected, but if it is so then I think > the designers > > should get over it. The current implementation is too easy > to censor. > > What is the use of an anonymity enabling service if it gets blocked? > > Either you believe in anonimity and free speech with _all_ it's > > consecuences or you do not. If you do not, then fine; a lot of good > > people feel the same way and think there are "limits". I, > personally, > > do not and would encourage the tor developers and the EFF > to take this > > view or at least be neutral and let each node decide. > > > > At least leave it up to the local node. Make an unpublished > / unlisted > > option just as in pots, and not for testing purposes. > > > > What am I missing? Regards, - Manuel >
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