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RE: FW: I still do not understand...

Paul, Thanks for the quick comments. On the second point: yes, they
are different things but related to the point of one being a necessary
condition for the other. No communication (censorship) obviates the
possibility of anonymity. I am sure you obviously agree and that your
comment is directed towards what should (or, in fact, is) the scope
of the project. I understand that all problems can not be solved at
once or with one solution. I just feel that more effort should be done
not to enable the easy possibility (as blach hole lists) to disable
the project.

As far as the first point: I assumed that we were all running on the
same Matrix, I am just looking for the red pill. Cheers, -Manuel

> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-or-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxx 
> [mailto:owner-or-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Paul Syverson
> Sent: Wednesday, May 25, 2005 15:03
> To: or-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: Re: FW: I still do not understand...
> Hi Manuel,
> Two points. First, if nothing about the nodes is published or
> otherwise known to you the Tor client, there is no basis to think that
> the network (or the part presented to you) consists of anything but a
> hundred nodes run on a few highspeed machines by a single
> individual. Actually there is not even the need to setup a hundred
> distinct nodes. Basically there is no anonymity protection at all.
> Second, anonymity and censorship resistance are related but not the
> same. One could want to provide an anonymous communication network
> without a concomitant desire to provide censorship resistance. Also,
> censorship resistance is hard, and anonymity is just one of the
> building blocks for it. So, if you do want to build censorship
> resistance, you need to build good anonymity. And, you need to have
> researched, tested, and understood the anonymity provided to know
> to use it in the censorship resistance context.
> aloha,
> Paul
> On Wed, May 25, 2005 at 02:44:46PM -0700, admin wrote:
> > I am re-sending this to the mailing list as it apears that the
> > original mailing did not make it, -Manuel
> > 
> > ----------------------------------------------------------
> > 
> > Why respect,
> > 
> > Why do exit nodes have to be published? Why does the 
> address of *any*
> > node have to be published. Is this an inherent property of 
> the design,
> > or just an implementation shortcoming? Why can not the node 
> resolution
> > be done dynamically as one joins the net. I can easily the 
> possibility
> > of starting a connection, having the local tor consult a 
> central server
> > (call a root node, just as DNS) and then go from there.
> > 
> > I get the impression of this being a 'political' decision 
> to avoid being
> > accused of aiding or abetting abusive behavior. If I am wrong then I
> > would love to be corrected, but if it is so then I think 
> the designers
> > should get over it. The current implementation is too easy 
> to censor.
> > What is the use of an anonymity enabling service if it gets blocked?
> > Either you believe in anonimity and free speech with _all_ it's
> > consecuences or you do not. If you do not, then fine; a lot of good
> > people feel the same way and think there are "limits". I, 
> personally,
> > do not and would encourage the tor developers and the EFF 
> to take this
> > view or at least be neutral and let each node decide.
> > 
> > At least leave it up to the local node. Make an unpublished 
> / unlisted
> > option just as in pots, and not for testing purposes.
> > 
> > What am I missing? Regards, - Manuel

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