Thus spake Timo Schoeler (timo.schoeler@xxxxxxxxxxxxx):
> I don't want to be a party-pooper, but installing just another big node
> (like blutmagie) would still mean
>
> * relatively simple eavesdropping of exit traffic
>
> When speaking in terms of bandwidth, e.g. 150Mbps, then I'd rather
> spread it across n machines with 150Mbps/n each.
The counterpoint is that scale really works in our favor the other
way, along a number of different fronts:
1. Bandwidth will be significantly cheaper in bulk
2. ISPs take larger customers more seriously
A. This means you're much more likely to get SWIP/ARIN 'whois'
allocation to better handle abuse complaints.
B. The ISP be much more likely to tolerate the occasional abuse
complaint that makes it back to them.
3. There probably really aren't that many super-friendly yet
affordable ISPs to begin with.
I feel like all this means that the answer here is for us to try to
create as many consolidated exit nodes like Olaf's and Moritz's as we
can, rather than nickle and diming it with a lot of small time nodes
that aren't going to last very long because ISPs don't want to deal
with them.
In fact, #3 especially underscores this point, because really, what is
the point of creating 'n' small time nodes at one tor-friendly ISP?
Anyone interested in surveilling that traffic will just watch the ISPs
uplink either way..
--
Mike Perry
Mad Computer Scientist
fscked.org evil labs
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