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Re: [tor-talk] Anti-Sybil (re: Explain... all the Nodes)

On 5/2/19, grarpamp <grarpamp@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Node location, payment, OS, ISP, uptimes, anon / nym / PGP / GovID,
> workplace, politic, blogs, whatever else you can imagine,
> including incorporating what's already in the consensus, contact,
> MyFamily, nickname, both real world and virtual infos,
> operator to operator p2p Web of Trust...

Syverson writes:
> Note that we created a research system for gathering such data,
> reasoning about the trust implications, and applying it to routing
> decisions. we wrote a paper on it that we presented at PETS 2015.
> "20,000 In League Under the Sea: Anonymous Communication, Trust,
> MLATs,and Undersea Cables"
> https://www.petsymposium.org/2015/papers/04_Jaggard.pdf

Its mentioned modularity is a nice feature wherein
here any number of module author groups could collate
data in their areas of interest / knowledge into modules
that then get plugged into the node selection framework.

Usually on the lists people often seek to
avoid or stay with certain countries, so that
leads to a "jurisdiction / MLAT" module.
There could be "seabed fiber owner operator" module.
A human-to-human operator WoT module.
Many more you can think up.

Tor currently offers perhaps only three, they are
in essence the default modules...
- random selection and exit policy
- bandwidth / consensus weights
- DA decisions

Keep the defaults, or go with community assemblings,
or choose whichever modules you want and any
specific configuration each provides, add them
into the node selection engine under any relative
weighting you choose, point the engine at the controller,
or otherwise load it into the overlay daemon.

It would not be difficult to conceive how such
framework could be extended for use with
many of the node based overlay networks.

Is it wise to override the defaults of any such network?
Perhaps until there are networks strongly or completely
resistant to Sybil, Vampires, and any other classes of
attacks... there may be cases and conditions where it is,
and many where it isn't... one size might not fit all.

There would probably be some interest out there in
developing a list of all potential modules. And even coding and
datafeeding the more popular ones, say the "Human WoT",
as a proof of concept exploration.

Note Bittorrent "Here's a bunch of random nodes, good luck"...
for which many communities collate and maintain published lists
of known or suspect nodes to block (MAFIAA networks, LEA, etc)
by plugging them into clients, resolvers, and packet filters, in an
effort to reduce risk of Sybil beyond the defaults.
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