On Sat, 2007-11-24 at 14:58 +0100, kazaam wrote: > > > > 1) mout are born in few weeks > > 2) all of them are exit router, no other > > country has more than 50% > > What wanna Chinese do if they just have exit-routers? > Phishing unsecured logins or trying to fake ssl certificates? > Just with exit-routers you can't compromise the anonymity of > the tor network. If the user doesn't act stupid... The right question is "What the Chinese government or TLA's can do controlling at leat the 25% of network?" For example, CN has comlete control over 1/64 of Tor network traffic, or abour 2%. I understand that Tor has a lot of crypto in place to defend against rogue nodes, also when they are acting cooperatively. I understand also that too much configurable options in Tor can be problematic, from a programming, a debugging, and a partitioning attack point of view. But I Would be very happy to have a fuckNodeByCountryCode= in the config file. Guess my favorite value ... Ciao. Marco -- +--------------- http://www.winstonsmith.info ---------------+ | il Progetto Winston Smith: scolleghiamo il Grande Fratello | | the Winston Smith Project: unplug the Big Brother | | Marco A. Calamari marcoc@xxxxxxxxx http://www.marcoc.it | | DSS/DH: 8F3E 5BAE 906F B416 9242 1C10 8661 24A9 BFCE 822B | + PGP RSA: ED84 3839 6C4D 3FFE 389F 209E 3128 5698 ----------+
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