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Re: Active Attacks - Already in Progress?

Thus spake Theodore Bagwell (toruser1@xxxxxxx):

> I don't take issue with these particular nodes, nor the method in which
> they are multiplied.
> What concerns me is that any single entity (person/organization) is
> capable of convincing my Tor client to use it in the majority of
> circuits I build. The clusters I pointed out before have been vouched
> for by the community, and that's fine, let's assume they're not evil.
> But the fact remains that nobody - good or evil - should be capable of
> making themselves a party in my circuit with such reliability.

Unfortunately, Exit bandwidth is really hard to maintain if it is not
centralized, and all bandwidth is much much cheaper in bulk. It is
very hard to convince an ISP to put up with the noise, attacks, and
abuse complaints if you are a low budget node:

Rather than cripple the network by forcing more clients to use slower
nodes more often, we have opted to try to document the process of
running a high capacity Tor exit node:

We have to do the best with the situation we actually have. Trying to
force the network to route as if it were the network we *wish* we had
will only make it completely unusable. 

Please help us to create the network we *wish* we had.

Mike Perry
Mad Computer Scientist
fscked.org evil labs

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