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Re: [tor-talk] Facebook brute forcing hidden services
On Sat, Nov 1, 2014 at 3:22 PM, Mirimir <mirimir@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 11/01/2014 02:22 AM, grarpamp wrote:
>> I would never use this unless you were actually censored from
>> accessing facebook via clearnet. All it will do is serve to officially
>> tell facebook that you are a tor user that FB can then further
>> discriminate against as a class in the future once they start to
>> lock down clearnet against exit nodes, travelers, etc or whatever
>> their scheme is or will be.
>>
>> Remember, FB's official policy is still:
>> - Real Names required
>> - Phone Numbers / ID required
>> - DOB required
>> - Gender required
>> - Email required
>> - Etc required
>> - Users are the product that is being mined and sold and shared.
>>
>> Such non optional elements, and choices, powers and rights
>> removed from the user, are in direct opposition to the principles
>> of Tor and anonymity. Normally support for onion/i2p is good thing,
>> but when still backed by crap like this it's largely meaningless.
>
> Perhaps Alec could comment about the applicability of Facebook's
> official "real names" etc policy where users in repressive regimes are
> using https://facebookcorewwwi.onion/ to conceal their locations and
> identities. If users are not allowed -- indeed, strongly encouraged --
> to use pseudonyms under those circumstances, there is ideed zero point
> in providing a hidden-service address.
>
That's what *slays* me about this.
On one hand I think its' great to have a tor hidden service for
facebook as there are legitimate use cases for it.
On the other, the juxtaposition of the least privacy-sensitive tool in
the WORLD against tor is a contrast that damn near hurts to look at.
This will be a continual source of amusement for me, but maybe
something of value will come out of this.
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