Re: [tor-talk] MITM attack on TLS

[Justin <davisjustin002@xxxxxxxxx>]

Ivan,
If he does overcome his laziness, Iâm ready to use another transport.  He has not deployed a cert.  I know this for a fact because the filter heâs using will prompt users to download it to their devices.  When it comes to storing traffic, I am pretty sure that Meek will stop connecting if it canât verify the TLS connection.  When it comes to whether or not it matters, yes it does.  Because decrypting all traffic at the gateway slows down the Internet, so heâs going to have to decide what to decrypt.  My threat model assumes that Meek-Google will be broken.  It also assumes that the Amazon and Azure versions may be broken.  Should they all be broken, I will switch to another transport.
> On Nov 21, 2015, at 5:26 PM, Ivan Markin <twim@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> Justin:
>> I have calculated that he is probably too lazy to check his logs.
> 
> Dangerous! What will happen if they overcome their laziness?
> If they already created CA cert and even deployed it in some way there
> is no hope that laziest admin do not just save all the stuff you do (and
> not MitM-ing TLS). They can and use it against you later.
> 
>> Even if Meek-Google is broken, I got more information from him that
>> would indicate that he probably wonât MITM Meek-Amazon or Azure.  If
>> it does become dangerous, I will switch to one of those.
> 
> Does it matter which TLS to MitM if they have CA in your computer
> already installed?
> 
> I recommend to switch now, meek doesn't work in this case as it's
> supposed to. But it's all about your threat model and up to you.
> 
> -- 
> Ivan Markin
> 
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