Thus spake Dave Page (grimoire@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx): > http://www.reuters.com/article/internetNews/idUSL1055133420070910 Hrmm. With this, and the talk of half-baked squid exit filtering, might it be time for a CensoredExit flag (which would do something like allow clients to avoid it for port 80 exits, or a user-defined port list)? I am routinely censored by China.. Last week they didn't like me shopping for some O'Reilly books on oreilly.com about 802.11 networking and continually closed my connection... (The symptom for this filtering is a series of "Connection: closed" privoxy messages, which comes from the Great Firewall's RST spoofing method of operation). More and more these filters are going to interfere with real research people are trying to do via Tor about human rights issues, state-sanctioned terrorism, state-funded paramilitary, genocide past and present, obscure technology, "criminal skills", etc. Allowing them to hinder Tor user experience randomly is a poor property for a censorship-resistant network to have. The major problem I see with such a flag is that some defintions of it may end up causing it to apply to pretty much every exit node.. Is it possible for us to draw the line somewhere? Maybe just base it on user reporting of excessive inconvenience, with some blanket applications for known egregiously offending countries? -- Mike Perry Mad Computer Scientist fscked.org evil labs
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