Do you mean how many can you use I in parallel for different circuits? Or how many you can put one after the other?
I'm pretty sure that without changing the source code you can only use one bridge at the start of each circuit. Now if you mean in parallel I don't know how Tor behaves if you give it a list of, let's say, 10 bridges BUT, in any case, keep in mind that the more bridge nodes you connect directly to, the more you risk connecting to a compromised one which can lead to timing attacks.
BTW you should take the conversation to the tor-talk list since it's not about relays or hidden service operators anymore (and I'm not even sure if this list is for hidden service operators either).
Cheers.
On 1/9/2013 2:57 PM, Coyo wrote:
Oh, I misread that. Nevermind!On 1/9/2013 4:41 AM, Konstantinos Asimakis wrote:
When I say "entry guards" i mean entry guards from the perspective of a tor node acting as a client.First of all, AFAIK, bridge relays act as entry guards, meaning they *replace* the first step of your tor circuits, they don't extend them to 4 nodes.
Am i mistaken in believing that a tor bridge relay acts as a client on behalf of the actual tor client behind it?
Or does the short list of bridge relays act as entry guards, and connect to other tor relays as the first hop tor relay?
Though I have another question!
How many bridge relays, with or without protocol obfuscation, can you use simultaneously?
Is there a limit? Can you configure that limit?
Are bridge relays in the list written to torrc chosen at random up to a certain limit?
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