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Re: [tor-talk] On the Theory of Remailers
> On Mon, Jan 07, 2013 at 11:29:06PM -0500, grarpamp wrote:
>> > It is an interesting questions, if with a modern user interface, can
>> > get to new life?
>> I see no reason the state of the art from the legacy remailer types
>> can't be combined and updated into a new service running on some
>> of the same relay machines we have for Tor today. Even if only
>> 10% ran them it would probably be more hosts than were ever
>> behind the old remailer nets. And relay operators already have the
>> abuse experience in place.
> Most exit operators block port 25 -- for a very good reason.
Please don't easily dispose remailers and look at their potential.
High latency networks are not tied to port 25. They could use any port.
Even if the Tor exit operators don't want to be in an exit position for
e-mail traffic, they could still be a middle node.
Neither remailers are tied to clearnet spam. If we assume that remailers
can not be used to mail people in normal internet because of spam, they
could mimic "hidden services", i.e. internal mail addresses only known to
the people who should know them.
Pseudonymous reply address for remailers:
Remailers aren't tied to messaging as well.
Nymserver can also fetch websites with high latency. In theory high
latency networks complement low latency networks such as Tor and can
provide strong anonymity.
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