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Re: all traffic through a VPN on top of tor, done!
On Fri, 13 Nov 2009, Paul Syverson wrote:
But lets say one sets up X Tor nodes in X different locales and configure
my Tor to use one of those X for my entry, and one of those X for my exit
... I'm still throttled by my middle hop, but the odds are much higher in
my favor, and I may only need to rebuild my connection once or twice to get
an acceptable speed.
Ignoring what the underlying network can observe, the value to having
three hops is that the first and last ones don't know about each other
directly (so immediately know who to attack to completely deanonymize
a connection; they instead need to iterate such an attack). But if you
enter and leave the network via nodes you control, the only thing you
are getting from adding a "public" hop in the middle is a greater
chance of an adversary observing you. The problem with your design is
that if anyone discovers the nodes are under your control, then things
emerging from/entering them will be suspected of being associated with
you. (It was similar considerations that led us to recommend even in
the onion routing designs that predated Tor that the network not just
be run by/for the DoD.) Worse still, if you add just a middle hop that
is not yours, you make things worse, not better. Any time it is you
going to a destination observed by your adversary and via a middle hop
owned by the adversary, he will be right in guessing the connection is
more likely to be yours than are arbitrary connections through the
network. He will get this without needing to see your entry connection
into the network.
Ok, that is perfectly sensible. My immediate thought, however, is "if all
X of my nodes are in different locales (US, Canada, CH, DE, NZ, whatever)
wouldn't this correlation be awfully difficult, especially if service is
not directly under my name (company front, straw man purchase, fake signup
name, etc. ?)"
It's just a thought - I realize your problem is the real-world assurances
that people need when they are really under survelliance, and not some
rich white guys IT hobby.
The question is, what values of X are required in order for correlation,
etc., to not be laughable ?
(the assumption here is that I put my X Tor nodes on the actual Tor
network, but reserve some percentage of their bandwidth exclusively for my
own use ... so they look and act like actual Tor nodes ...)
These are tricky questions, and we are doing ongoing research about it
now. An initial result we have is not quite to answer this question
but instead to look at how you should do routing to avoid compromised
entry and exit nodes if you trust some nodes more than others and
where the difference in trust and percentage of trusted and untrusted
nodes are input parameters. Published in the IEEE Computer Security
Foundations Symposium, cf.
I think I will have a better, but not complete answer, to questions
closer to yours within several months. But it will involve some
complicated analysis. For now, I suggest you follow Andrew's
advice---or just take your risk if speed matters more than security
for you. But know then that you are entering uncharted and especially
ill-understood waters and that any guesses you might have for X (or
even that this is the right question) are likely to be wrong, and you
really will have no idea what kind of protection you are getting.
Thanks very much for a very helpful reply - I appreciate it. It will be
interesting if you conclude that X is larger than (the current size of the
public Tor network) :)
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