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Re: Anonymity through decentralization (was Re: Ultimate solution)
We have produced a commercial that should help explain the service we
are offering. I have no intention of holding it out as onion routing
unless we switch to onion routing, and I will elaborate on our website
as to how the network works.
Would you be interested in a video that depicts how onion routing
works? I've been toying with the idea of putting one together.
> On Sun, Mar 25, 2007 at 09:57:20AM -0600, Arrakis wrote:
>> 2) Torpark is not commercial, it is totally free and open source. We
>> simply offer an upgrade to get higher speeds than the tor network can
>> 3) The fact that trust isn't distributed is a positive, not a
>> negative, because you don't have to trust everyone with your outgoing
>> plaintext traffic. We have independent security auditors make sure our
>> admins are not tracking anyone or doing anything malicious.
> I'm leaving the licensing discussion alone for now, but I wanted to
> respond to this technical point. Tor's security  comes from two
> components. The first is its large and diverse user base -- as the user
> base expands, the mere use of Tor doesn't narrow you down to a specific
> user community or specific few people who are known to have fetched the
> program . The second is the diversity of the relays -- as the Tor
> network expands, fewer adversaries are able to be in enough places on
> the network to succeed at linking senders to recipients.
> Now, it's still an open research question what metrics we should use
> for these components (that is, how exactly we measure the security we
> get from them), but my intuition is that after a certain point the first
> component doesn't contribute much more to security -- meaning in Tor's
> current state, its security grows primarily as the network grows.
> And remember that by "being in enough places", I mean being in a position
> to watch (or otherwise measure ) the traffic; the best attacks we know
> right now only look at characteristics of the traffic flow , because
> any sort of coordinated compromise of many relays is probably harder.
> I'm not saying Tor's design is perfect. We are still grappling with
> Sybil attack questions, and as you say we need to encourage our users to
> employ end-to-end encryption and authentication when appropriate. And
> we're still not happy that a widely dispersed attacker can probably do
> very well against Tor.
> But a central organization that administers all the relays, even if it
> puts them in different places geographically, and even if it promises to
> do perfect audits and employ only perfect people, aims for a fundamentally
> different sort of security than Tor aims to provide. The traffic analysis
> attacks above are still just as much of a concern, but insider attacks and
> other attacks on/by the organization are now a significant question too.
> You can launch a new single-hop proxy service, commercial or not,
> proprietary or not. You can also launch a multi-hop service where you
> control every hop. And the license of the Tor software lets you use it
> if you find it useful for your purposes. But please don't deceive your
> users by changing the security context and then encouraging them to think
> that just because the Tor software is present somewhere in the picture,
> they are benefitting from the type of security that Tor aims to provide.
>  By "security", I'm talking primarily about unlinkability here;
> but that's a different thread.
>  http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#usability:weis2006
>  http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#torta05
>  http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#danezis:pet2004